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IMPOVERISHED LIBERALISM:
Does the New York Workfare Program Violate Human
Rights?
Anthony Bertelli*
I. INTRODUCTION

This article examines the New York Work Experience
Program (hereinafter "WEP")' instituted in anticipation of the Federal
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (hereinafter "Welfare Reform"). This initiative is the largest
and oldest in the nation and the most extensive work program since
the New Deal, expecting 4,000 to 5,000 welfare recipients to enter the
workforce each month over the next few years Through the lens of
contemporary individualist rights doctrine, I attempt to examine the
titular question of whether the workfare scheme violates human
rights. I conclude that WEP unjustly limits human rights to freedom
and well-being and is morally invalid under the foundationalist
framework of Alan Gewirth, but that the contractarian libertarianism
of David Gauthier and Jan Narvesonjustifies a lesser package of state
support than would Gewirth or current New York Law. Nonetheless,
both syntheses illuminate problems with the current administration of
WEP. It should be noted that these problems derive from WEP as it
is currently administered, and are not inherent in the basic notions of
welfare-to-work programs.
The individualist conception views rights as prior to duties.
Consequently, there is no need to "earn" rights, as they vest in an
individual by virtue of her being human. Alternatively, a collectivist
* Ph.D. Candidate, University of Chicago; M.A., Pennsylvania State
University;
J.D., University of Pittsburgh; B.A., University of Chicago. The author wishes to
thank Alan Gewirth for helpful comments and to Jill Koecher for help and
inspiration.
N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 331 (McKinney 1998).
2 PUB. HEALTH AND WELF. ACT 42 U.S.C.A. § 601, etseq. (West 1988).
3 David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions Regarding
the Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1, 14 (1997).
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vision of rights conceives of a conjunction of rights and duties, where
a person must fulfill duties to the community in order to have rights
therein.4 The individualist version of rights is the dominant paradigm
in American law, and it is for this reason that I have chosen it as the
framework for the analysis that follows. Regarding workfare and
other means-tested social welfare programs not elaborated in the
following pages, I argue that contractarian libertarianism is
insufficient to evaluate WEP or any extant program. This is due to
the resistance of libertarianism to any positive obligation on the part
of the state toward individuals in fulfillment of claims to social and
economic security.5 Consequently, I endorse the theory of social
security offered by Gewirth.
In the course of its analysis, this article contrasts two polar
conceptions of the role of the state which replicate the division
between the individualist rights theories noted above:
(1) the liberal position, associated here with Gewirth, in which
government can rightly engage in positive assistance efforts, (this has
been the backbone of poor relief efforts from the New Deal to the
Great Society); and
(2) the rhetoric of Welfare Reform, including concepts of
personal responsibility, the minimization of positive governmental
assistance, and the rational economic choice associated with

4 For a collectivist theory, see, e.g., R.H.

TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY

(1920).
' The discussion presented in Parts II and HI unpacks this assertion, though a
caveat is appropriate at this point. The libertarian theory that is discussed in this
article should not to be confused with the mixed rhetoric of its contemporary
conservative political adherents. There seem to be two main variants of the latter:

(1) a market theory asserting that though it may be unfortunate some individuals
fall by the wayside, the concern is much less with the claims of those individuals
than with the welfare of the economy in general; (2) a theory of personal
responsibility suggesting that all (or at least most) individuals will indeed flourish
if pushed to achieve, to work, while the provision of a safety net (as in the case of

WEP) may be accepted for those truly unable to perform, for example, children and
the mentally disabled. The theory used in this paper is far more akin to the denial
of individual social and economic rights in (1) than to the more liberal version of
libertarianism espoused in (2).
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libertarianism.6 The former liberal position is concerned with the
moral decision to actively assist disadvantaged persons at the societal
level, although it has certainly permitted unequal treatment of the
poor through its oversimplified deserving/undeserving classification
scheme.7 Although the latter view may not appear to have similar
moral concerns it does encompass complex issues. Central among
these is the notion that the employment of self-inl77terested rational
choice decision making by individuals is actually moral choice, a
position stated most deftly in the contemporary academy by
Gauthier.8 The Gautherian argument leads to a type of libertarianism
that, according to John Rawls:
[D]oes not combine liberty and equality in the way
that liberalism does; it lacks the criterion of
reciprocity and allows excessive social economic
inequalities as judged by that criterion. In this case
we do not have stability for the right reasons, which is
always 9 lacking in a purely formal constitutional
regime.
The Rawlsian, and as will be shown, Gewirthian, solution is the
See supra note 5. Libertarianism is alive and well in legal and philosophical
discourse as a challenge to the welfare state and justification for Welfare Reform
is evidenced by the recent articles in Symposium, The Problems of Market
Liberalism, 15 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1 (1998).
7 The classification of the poor as deserving-those persons, like the blind,
requiring relief due to conditions beyond their control-or undeserving-the ablebodied poor-has been a practice throughout both British and American social
welfare history. See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-1994 (1994); KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, ENGLAND'S ROAD
6

TO SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM THE "STATUTE OF LABORERS" IN 1349 To THE

"BEVERIDGE REPORT" OF 1942 (1943).
DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).

This argument dates to the
eighteenth century as a challenge to the Kantian notion that solely rational actors
8

lack "the predisposition to moral personality." IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN
THE BOUNDS OF REASON ALONE § VI,
9 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM

26 (1793).
lviii (1996).
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creation of state institutions that produce stability in terms of
equality, mutuality, and dignity through positive measures assisting
the disadvantaged."° The libertarian solution involves no such
institutions, but, rather, a network of private contractual
arrangements.
John Rawls has described libertarianism as "an impoverished
form of liberalism," because it does not attend to concerns of social
and economic inequality and conditions of non-mutuality in its
expression of fundamental freedoms." In this context, 'liberalism'
denotes a belief in the ability of all individuals to enjoy the
fundamental liberties, including wealth-building, association, speech,
and the like. Rawls finds libertarianism impoverished in that its lack
of positive state action to benefit the poor precludes that group from
ever fully enjoying the liberties.' 2 Workfare itself, as conditioned by
Welfare Reform and exemplified by WEP, represents a case of
impoverished liberalism, though not to the extent of the libertarian
project. It attempts to achieve an ethos of personal responsibility
among those who do not have the social, economic, intellectual, or
emotional assets to achieve it. This is not to say that all workfare
recipients are equally disadvantaged. The list is simply meant to
generally characterize the types of deficiencies that workfare
recipients encounter. However, the majority of welfare dependent
individuals are not positioned for unsubsidized work at the present
time, and no legislative edict can instantaneously change that
reality. 3 Personal responsibility is a noble liberal goal. Indeed, it is
the goal of both Welfare Reform and Gewirth's social program.
Nonetheless, workfare cannot achieve it without a more positive and
informed program of assistance to participants. As will be shown,
Contractarian Libertarianism cannot offer any suggestions toward this
end, while Gewirth, and in several instances, the New York Courts,
are instructive.

10

See id. at 1(viii) - 1 (ix).

" See id. at I (viii).
2See id.
" See infra text accompanying note 49.
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The workfare case provides a forum for conflict between these
competing social ethics. This article attempts to address the most
fractious issues of that debate while arguing for a more Gewirthian
notion of personal responsibility. In Part I, the nature of workfare in
New York as well as the case law developments limiting the program
are introduced. Though most of the surveyed litigation occurred in
New York City, the scope of the discussion is statewide. The moral
philosophies of Gewirth, Gauthier, and Narveson are presented in
Part II within the historical context of individualist human rights
thinking. The discussion turns, in Part III, to the assessment of New
York workfare given these theories, with some consequences for the
theories themselves.
II. WHAT IS WORKFARE?
The idea of mandating that welfare recipients perform work
activities in return for their benefits is not of recent creation. In 1967,
the Work Incentive Program (hereinafter "WIN"), a close relative of
workfare, permitted states to mandate that able-bodied recipients of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter "AFDC")
participate in the workplace. 14 As such, WIN was more regulatory
than incentive-providing.
WIN used a stick-and-carrot approach. The stick was
applied mostly to fathers on AFDC-UP [a cash
assistance program for unemployed fathers] and
children over the age of 16 who were neither in school
nor working. They were mandated to register for
WIN and could be dropped from AFDC if they
declined to participate without good cause [as
determined by welfare officials]. The carrot was in
the form of work incentives..., promise of training
and employment services, increased funding for care,
14

JOEL

F.

HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF

POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA

138-41 (1991).
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and encouragement of mothers with school-age
children to volunteer for WIN and receive training
and other support services. 5
WIN programs, unlike Welfare Reform, allowed for indefinite
terms of welfare dependency, and throughout the next twenty-five
years, sentiment grew for the curtailment of dependence spells. 6
President Clinton was elected in 1992 on the platform of making
welfare a "second chance, not a way of life.' 17 AFDC rules were
relaxed for a 1993 experiment in Wisconsin that limited AFDC
receipt spells to two years. The first year in full-time work or a state
supported training program with full cash benefits, the second in fulltime, private sector employment to avoid foregoing AFDC cash
benefits, and subsequent years with only food stamps and partial
housing vouchers where individuals remained eligible under AFDC
guidelines.' 8 This 'Wisconsin Experiment' provided the framework
for federal Welfare Reform.' 9 The genesis of contemporary workfare
in New York was WEP, which predated the August 1996 passage of
Welfare Reform by nearly two years.
A. Wages and Cash Benefits
WEP mandated twenty-six hours of employment for the city
by all welfare recipients physically able to work.20 Common
examples of this public employment are entry-level office assistance
in public agencies and the maintenance of public property.2 ' One
major WEP initiative, New York City's Park Career Training
Program (PACT), consists largely of janitorial and sanitation

15

16

Id. at 14041 (emphasis added).
See PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 225.

17 Id.
IS

See id. at 240.

'9 See
20
2,

id.

See N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS.Tit. 18 § 385.13 (1995).
See Gregory, supra note 3, at 14.
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activities wherein participants maintain public park facilities.22 In
1996, thirty-five hours of PACT work per week obtained for the
worker a monthly cash benefit of $352 and $112 in food stamps and
medical benefits. 23 These workers have helped the city clean up its
parks in dramatic fashion, with some ninety percent determined by
the city to be clean in 1996 where that figure was seventy-six percent
in 1995.24
In contrast to the WIN programs mentioned above, single
mothers receiving AFDC 25 were compulsorily involved in WEP
beginning in April 1996.26 An AFDC recipient working in mandated
employment of at least twenty hours per week earned between $.80
to $1.50 per hour in cash and food stamps in addition to the AFDC
cash benefit amount,27 with some employment bringing no additional
benefit.28
In 1997, a trial court held that a Department of Social
Services29 (DSS) policy of determining the required number of
workfare hours for individual participants, without determining the
appropriate wage rate, violated the New York State Constitution."
Alternatively, workers were entitled to be paid the prevailing wage of
non-workfare employees at the same work site, for the number of
hours worked, in a combined grant of cash and food stamps. 3 1 The
Supreme Court Appellate Division later held that a statutory
2 See id.
2 See id.
24
25

See id. at 14-15.
The program became known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

(TANF) after Welfare Reform.
See Gregory, supranote 3, at 15.
See id.
See Davila v. Hammons, Index No. 407163/96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Sept. 21,
1998).
29 New York City's welfare administration agency.
30 Bmkbman v. Guiliani, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1997). The New York Constitution
requires that state contractors and subcontractors performing work for the state
receive payment equal to the prevailing wage for the type of work performed. N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 17.
31 Brukhman, 662 N.Y.S. 2d at 914. See also Enzian v. Wing, 248 App. Div. 965,
670 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 4 Dept. 1998).

26
27
28
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enactment of the federal minimum wage as the workfare wage,32
regardless of the type of work performed, rendered the trial court
decision moot.33
B. Work Hours Requirements
Consistent with the provisions of Welfare Reform, the
amount of workfare participation by Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF)-the fixed term successor to AFDC under Welfare34
Reform-recipients is to reach thirty hours weekly by January 2000.
Welfare Reform has increased the magnitude of participation in
workfare programs for both TANF mothers and adult recipients of
cash assistance. Currently, 25% of all welfare recipients must
participate, with that proportion increasing to 50% in 2002 for both
35
groups.

An important consequence of WEP has been the attrition rate
of student welfare recipients from higher education. For example, by
June 1996, the enrollment of welfare recipients in the City University
of New York system had declined by 18.5%.36 Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani claimed that work should trump education in the schedules
of welfare recipients in that it restores a sense of dignity lost through
dependence on entitlement programs. 37 However, courts have
chipped away the Mayor's stringent position. In 1996, a trial judge
enjoined DSS from placing welfare recipients into workfare programs
without first evaluating whether their job prospects would be better
enhanced through education. Moreover, work requirements were
32 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(b) (McKinney 1998).
33 See Brukhman v. Guiliani, 678 N.Y.S.2d 45,47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1" Dept. 1998).
34 42 U.S.C.A. § 607.

35 See id.
36 See Karen Arneson, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment to Fall, CUNY Says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, at Al.
37 See David Firestone, Praisingthe Wonders of Workfare, Guiliani Finds a
Campaign Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1997, at B3.
3' Gregory, supra note 3, at 17. An additional preliminary injunction was recently
issued requiring that for each college student participating in WEP, the city conduct
a full assessment of the recipient's "educational background, work history, and
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declared unlawful where they place undue time burdens
on those
39
workfare participants enrolled in educational programs.
The burdens of WEP placements have created hardships for
secondary students as well. In May 1998, attorneys for a class of
New York City high school students participating in WEP won an
important judgment regarding the scheduling of workfare activities.4"
A trial court issued a preliminary injunction against DSS for
assigning students to work activities that did not prevent them from
missing classes, but rendered the completion of homework
assignments and adequate sleep effectively impossible.4'
C. Work Conditions
Workfare Testimony in the case of Capersv. Guiliani,which
challenges the health and safety of the workfare environment in New
York City, illuminates the less than dignified conditions under which
PACT participants work:
On June 18th... we came across two dead cats and
two dead dogs... They had been dumped by the side
of the road. Because I had no gloves, I had to pick
them up with my bare hands. The animals had been
run over by automobiles and were oozing blood and
entrails. When I picked up the animals to throw them

supportive services needs and develop for each recipient an employment plan based
on the assessment and, to the extent possible, the preferences of the recipient."
Welfare Law Center, FurtherRelief in NYC Assessment and Training Workfare

Case (visited November 25, 1998) <http://www.welfarelaw.org/webbul/998WEB.htrn#Further Relief in NYC Assessment and Training>. citing Davila v.
Hammons, No. 407163/96 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co., filed September 21, 1998).
39 Hesthag v. Hammons, 660 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (1996).
4 Matthews v. Barrios-Paoli, 676 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1998). Workfare requirements
for students ages eighteen and nineteen are to consist of educational activities and
such work that is consistent with the participant's "employability plan." N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 336-a(4)(b) (McKinney 1998). An employability plan is a means for
welfare caseworkers to assess the abilities and aspirations of program participants.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
41 Matthews, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 758-63.
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into the garbage truck, the guts splattered on my shoes
and pants. My co-worker vomited and the supervisor
in the van said nothing. (Anastacio Serrano)
[We] have no access to a toilet either in the parking
lot or out on the highway. If we need to urinate or
move our bowels, we have to squat behind a tree or
bush or ask one of our co-workers to hold up a plastic
bag to shield us from the passing cars. (Tamika
42
Capers)
A preliminary injunction was entered against the city
requiring adequate training, equipment, and safety measures as well
as sanitary facilities and drinking water for WEP participants. 4 This
order was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court Appellate
Division inlight of the state legislature's subsequent classification
of WEP participants as public employees45 for purposes of the Public
Employee Health and Safety Act.46 This re-classification provides
WEP participants access to all complaint and inspection procedures
applicable to New York State employees. The court required that the
claimants exercise the grievance procedure provided by the Act
47
before any claim would be heard at law.
D. Preparedness for Unsubsidized Work
The central policy principle of WIN, WEP, and all work
requirement laws is that workfare participants "will be furnished
work activities and employment opportunities, and necessary services
in order to secure unsubsidized employment that will assist

Welfare Law Center, Oozing blood and entrails, vomit and no bathrooms:
Workfare working conditions in New York City (visited November 21, 1998)
<http://www.welfarelaw.org/workfare abuse.html>.
43 Capers v. Guiliani, 677 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (N.Y. App. Div.lst Dept. 1998).
44 See id. at 356.
45 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 330(5) (McKinney 1998).
4See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a (McKinney 1998).
47 See Guiliani, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
42
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participants to achieve economic independence. 4 8
It is the
cornerstone ofpersonal responsibility. This is unlikely to unfold into
reality given the characteristics of program participants. Evidence
shows that:
Most welfare recipients are capable of performing
low-skill, entry-level jobs. Even in cities where
unemployment rates are low, the jobless rate for those
seeking entry-level jobs may be twice that of other
workers. For example, one study found that anywhere
from four to nine workers are in search of entry-level
jobs for every entry-level job opening. There is also a
geographic gulf between urban centers, where welfare
recipients are concentrated, and suburban areas, where
higher-wage jobs are often located. Companies,
therefore, need local county welfare agencies to help
find job applicants, aid new workers with child care,
provide employment counseling, and help transport
employees to their jobs. It is estimated that only
thirty percent of welfare recipients can make the
transition to private sector positions with minimal
support, while another forty percent could only be
hired after extensive pre-employment counseling and
training. Over thirty percent of welfare recipients,
however, will never be able to work because of
criminal records, drug addiction, or psychological
problems.49
Given the skill level of the workfare population and the
characteristics of the entry-level labor market, it appears that

N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 331 (McKinney 1998) (referring to the policy goal of
WEP); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1998) (citing policy goals of WIN).
41Gregory, supra note 3, at 18-19 (citations omitted); see also Paul R. Blackley,
Spatial Mismatch in Urban Labor Markets: Evidence from Large U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 39 (1990); Gary T. Burtless, Welfare
Recipients' Job Skills and Employment Prospects, 7 FuTURE OF CHILDREN 39
(1997).
48
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workfare has little chance of providing work experience that will lead
to unsubsidized employment. As will be shown in Part Ill, the
probability that workfare will restore dignity to participants is
effectively nugatory. In the following section, I turn to the
philosophical dialogue on social and economic rights to establish a
framework for an analysis of WEP.
II. CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
HUMAN RIGHTS

The technical conception of rights is important as an initial
matter. Wesley Hohfeld identified two types of relationships between
the object of a right, x, and the respondent of a right, y, that are
relevant to the principal discussion.5"
x has a liberty to do A-when x has no duty towards
y to do A, and y has a 'no-right' not to interfere with
x in x's doing A.
claim-right: x claims A from y-and y has a duty
towards x to do A. The claim-right allows for positive
correlative duties.5
Negative rights "set absolute 'side constraints' on actions in
that their correlative duties require refraining from actions that
interfere with persons' freedom., 52 Positive rights require, as
correlative duties, active assistance on the part of respondents,
including the state.53
The libertarianism that will be discussed conceives only of
negative liberty rights. Alternatively, Alan Gewirth's foundationalist
human rights approach requires the enforcement of both positive and
So WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (1964).
5' ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1106-07 (Lawrence Becker ed., 1992).
52

Id.

" See id.
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negative rights. Following a brief introduction to the historical
debate regarding human rights, Gewirth's argument 4 is juxtaposed
with the contractarian libertarianism of David Gauthier s5 and Jan
Narveson 6
A. Introduction to Current Debate on Social and Economic
Human Rights
There is a long history of discourse on the question of social
and economic rights which cannot possibly be adequately considered
here. By way of brief introduction, the dichotomy of social and
economic rights (e.g., social insurance) as separate from political and
civil rights (e.g., rights to the franchise or a fair trial) emerged in the
late-nineteenth century, the zenith of economic liberalism. Natural,
or human rights language was a part of the revolutionary struggles of
England in 1688 and France in 1789. 57 By the late-1800s, there was
a different flavor to the rights debate:
In a world of feudal and mercantilist economic
constraints and political dominance of a traditional
aristocracy of birth, universal natural rights were a
powerful weapon of the rising bourgeoisie. Initially,
arguments based on natural liberty were used to free
the process of capital accumulation from traditional
restraints and to justify social and political mobility,
but once bourgeois political power was established,
arguments of natural liberty came to be used
'4 See ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS (1996) [hereinafter "GEWIRTH
I"). The technical argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency first appeared
in ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978) [hereinafter "GEWIRTH II"].

's See GAUTHIER, supra note 8.
56

See JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988).

57

Indeed, the debate following the French Revolution among such noted figures
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790);

as

THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL
FALLACIES (1791), and MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS

OF MAN (1790) was central to the development of modem rights thought.
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principally to prevent the rise, and even the
protection, of lower classes... [Since] large portions
of the political center and right no longer denied the
idea of human rights, . . . they attacked only one
category or set of these rights-namely, social and
economic rights. 8
The twentieth century has seen its share of arguments against
of social and economic rights.59 In one well-known
existence
the
position, made in response to the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Maurice Cranston developed the following "tests for
the authenticity of any human right:"(1) practicability-it must be
feasible to give everyone the right; (2) universality-it must be a right
for all with a correlative duty for all; (3) paramount
importance-rights must not be confused with ideals, i.e., there is no
right to pleasure, while there is a right to rescue. 60 However,
Cranston's tests fail to separate the question of the moral justification
of social and economic rights from that of their practicability.
Gewirth, for example, would assert that such rights are justified even
where they are not presently practicable.6 '
A fundamental problem with the discussion of rights until the
late twentieth century was that all rights doctrine was essentially
intuitionistic, i.e., moral knowledge is apprehended directly through
a non-rational process. John Rawls explained that "while the
complexity of... moral facts requires a number of distinct principles,
there is no single standard that accounts for them or assigns them
their weights.., we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by
51 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

(1989).

30

Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43-53 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967); John 0.
Nelson, Against Human Rights, 65 PHILOSOPHY 341 (1990).
60 See Cranston, supranote 59, at 48-50. It is interesting to note the existence of
a positive duty on behalf of individuals even in this anti-human rights framework
as a contrast to the legal debate over "good samaritan" provisions in tort.
61 See GEWIRTH I, supra note 54, at 62-64. This follows from the Kantian notion
that 'ought implies can.'
59See, e.g.,
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what seems to us most nearly right." 62 Theorists such as St. Thomas
Aquinas and John Locke appealed to the first principles of natural law
as a rationale for moral rules, but the lack of explanation of such
principles runs afoul of the twentieth century tradition of analytic
philosophy. Supplication to higher law became highly questionable,
and the theoretical issue turned to whether moral values could be
generated from non-moral interests.63 The most important first step
away from intuitionism was Rawls' contractarian treatise, A Theory
ofJustice.
Rawls took the idea of the social contract in Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant to a more abstract level--"the principles ofjustice for the
basic structure of society are the object of the agreement." 4 To elicit
those principles, Rawls made a famous assumption about the
"original position"--his analogue to the state of nature-in which the
rules of society are chosen: choice is made behind a "veil of
ignorance.,6' No one knows his own position in society, his abilities,
psychological predilections, or even conceptions of the good.66 Since
the rules that are chosen will regulate all further agreements to be
made in society, the original position must be free from the exertion
of bias from natural or social contingencies upon the outcome.67
Rawls termed this manner of perceiving the principles of justice,
"justice as fairness. 68
Choice of principles in the Rawlsian synthesis occurs in a
purely hypothetical social milieu. Though assumed away by Rawls,
each of us is born with a set of social and biological characteristics
which are highly influential upon our future agency. 69 Rawls
accepted this unrealistic scenario for the choice of principles because
of its inherent fairness and the freedom of its actors.70 In any future
JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34(1971).
See NARVESON,supra note 56, at 148-49.
64 RAWLS, supra note 62, at 11.
65 See id.
62
63

See id.
See id.
6' See id. at 11-12.
69 See id. at 13.
70 See id.
6

67
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agreements, all parties would acknowledge that the rules of just
action to which they adhere are those that would have been decided
in a perfectly free and equal setting.7 ' The fairness of the original
position provides the basis for accepting the rules.' Therefore, in the
original position, individuals desire a set of "primary goods," i.e.,
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and
self-respect, which form the subject of bargaining.73 The principles
ofjustice would provide an allocation of these primary goods in the
hypothetical primordial scenario, and would describe basic human
rights afterward. 74 An examination of the resultant principles is75
omitted here as my concern is with the conclusions of later efforts.
Analytic philosophy did not calmly accept the veil of
ignorance.
Alternative efforts both within and without the
contractarian tradition blossomed in the wake of Rawls' seminal
work.7 6 The deontologica 77 theories that are the basis of my principal

See id.
72 See id.
71

73 See id. at 62. An important Rawlsian line of scholarship, that of basic rights, is

derived from this theory of primary goods. For example, Henry Shue has argued
that "[b]asic rights... are everyone's minimum reasonable demands on the rest of
humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no
self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept... rights are basic.
. . only if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights."
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 19 (1996). This argument for human rights to a
minimal allotment of primary goods is to be methodologically (though not
necessarily substantively) distinguished from that of Gewirth, which is not derived
through Rawls' contractarian method.
74 See RAWLS, supra note 62, at 62.
75 See RAWLS, supra note 62 at ch. II.
76 Rawls himself retooled his theory. RAWLS, supra note 9. Other important

treatments not discussed here include JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS
(1975) (justice can be defined in an ideal speech situation); RICHARD BRANDT, A
THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979 )(cognitive psychotherapy allows
rational critiques of desires which helps to unpack the nature ofjustice).
7' These theories take rights and duties as the basis of morality. Conversely,
teleological arguments judge acts solely on the basis of their consequences, i.e., no
claim to the goodness of an act can be made without knowledge of the fundamental
aim of the act. For modem examples of teleological arguments, see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY

(1981); see generally
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analysis are the foundationalist argument of Gewirth, and the
contractarian libertarianism s of Gauthier and Narveson. Both are

MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1984).
78 Perhaps the most influential libertarian argument is that of ROBERT
NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). His "entitlement theory of justice,"
centering on property rights, stands in opposition to Rawls' characterization of
individuals' initial endowments of social and physical attributes as morally
arbitrary. Nozick's entitlements to justly acquired property are enforced by a
"minimal state," which exists simply to enforce such rights and administer justice
via policing and judicial dispute resolution. The minimal state cannot engage in
wealth redistribution, e.g., transfer payments, or in the enforcement of anything less
than natural property rights. Rawls elucidates the point:
There is in general no uniform public law that
applies equally to all persons, but rather a
network of private agreements; this network
represents the procedures the dominant
protection agency (the state) has agreed to use
with its clients, as it were, and these
procedures may differ from client to client
depending on the bargain each was in a
position to make with the dominant agency.
No one can be compelled to enter into such an
agreement and everyone always has the
option of becoming an independent: we have
the choice of being one of the state's clients,
just as we do in the case of other associations.
While the [Nozickian] libertarian view makes
important use of the notion of agreement, it is
not a social contract theory at all; for social
contract theory envisages the original compact
as establishing a system of common public
law which defines and regulates political
authority and applies to everyone as a citizen.

Both political authority and citizenship are to
be understood through the conception of the
social contract itself.
Rawls, supranote 9, at 265. Though similar policy conclusions in the GauthierNarveson framework will be considered, I will not discuss Nozick's logic as it falls
without the contractarian tradition.
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anti-intuitionist, though Gauthier works within the contractarian
tradition, while Gewirth developed his theory as an alternative to
contractarianism.
B. The Principle of Generic Consistency and the Community of
Rights
Gewirth avoids all hypotheticals regarding the original
position by focusing fundamentally on the action of rational
agents-persons accepting deductive and inductive logic, including
empirical conclusions. His approach is foundationalist 9 in that it
begins with a generic practical truth for all individuals-'I do x in
pursuit of end E'-and reasons toward general moral principles. 8
Action is common to all classes of moral judgment made by rational
actors, and furthermore, there are certain stable, "generic"
components of all human action. 8' For Gewirth, action is both (1) the
product of unforced choice, i.e., it is voluntary and free, and (2)
performed for some subjectively "good" reason, i.e., it is worth
pursuing in the mind of the individual doing the act.82 Consequently,
each individual must regard as inherently good the voluntariness and
freedom required for her action. 83 Similarly, the increase in purposefulfillment resulting from the achievement of any goal is a generic
feature of action that all must perceive as good. 84 Generic purposefulfillment encompasses three notions of well-being: (1) basic-the
necessary preconditions of action, (2) non-subtractive-the ability to
retain what one has and finds subjectively good, and (3) additive-the
ability to increase purpose-fulfillment and capacity for action. 5

7' Foundationalism

in philosophy denotes an appeal to a fundamental grounding
for theory, as Gewirth provides by starting with a base claim that all individuals

must accept. This isto be contrasted with the nonfoundationalism of some analytic
philosophy, such as the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and post-modernism.
80 See Jan Narveson, Alan Gewirth 'sfoundationalismand the Well-Being State, 31
J. VALUE INQUIRY 485, 485 (1997).

"' See GEWIRTH II, supra note 54, at 89-90.
82 See id.
83 See id.
14 See id. at 51-53.
85 See id.
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Every agent must agree that these things are good because all agents
participate in purposive action-acts toward the fulfillment of
subjectively good purposes.8 6 To deny human rights to freedom and
any of the three types of well-being is to contradict one's compulsory
belief that these things are necessary for action. Thus, rights to
freedom and well-being are, for Gewirth, generic rights. Rights to all
other subjects are stipulations upon freedom and well-being.
Moral action involves the calculus of the interests of at least
one person other than the individual making the calculation.
Gewirth's argument has henceforth rested upon the prudential
calculations of the interests of a single individual. Human rights as
a moral concept must satisfy the conditions:
universality--what is right for an individual must be right for all
similarly situated persons,
equality-humanrights for all persons must be fulfilled, and
dignity-a person is a prospective purposive agent who attaches
worth (purposiveness) to her actions. 88
Having met the conditions of equality and dignity in the proof
discussed above, Gewirth combines universality with the requirement
of correlative duties present in the notion of claim-rights to elicit his
supreme moral principle, the "principle of generic consistency"
(PGC): "I ought at least to refrain from intervening with the freedom
and well-being of any prospective purposive agent," or put
differently, "[a]ct in accord with the generic rights of your recipients
as well as yourself." 9
Some generic claim-rights entail positive correlative duties.
The enforcement of those duties must, in many cases, fall upon the
state as respondent of the rights.90 The argument for state

86

See id.

87See GEWIRTH I, supranote 54, at 14.
88 See GEWIRTH II, supra note 54, at 135.

89Id.
o See GEWIRTH I, supra note 54, at 60-62.
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involvement proceeds in the following way. Since these rights are
morally necessary, their correlative duties must also be necessary. 992'
Where individuals cannot perform the duties, the state must do so.
This is exemplified in state agencies from police departments to child
welfare bureaus which assist individuals in achieving rights that they
cannot independently realize. The reasons for the inability of
individuals to realize rights range from collective action problems to
spatial mismatch to cognitive deficiencies. In this sense, the state can
be called the "community of rights"-"a society whose government
actively seeks to help fulfill the needs of its members, especially
those who are most vulnerable, for the freedom and well-being that
are the necessary goods of human agency, when persons cannot attain
this fulfillment by their own efforts. 93
C. Morals by Agreement and Contractarian Libertarianism
In contrast, Gauthier retains Rawls' contractarian
methodology, but incorporates the framework of rational choice
theory to circumvent the problems surrounding the original position.
There are no assumptions made with regard to the distribution of
resources among actors; bargains rest "upon no false ideological
appeals to the natural masterliness of masters or the natural
slavishness of slaves. 94 For Gauthier, a single principle describes
rational behavior in any cooperative interaction; the principle of
"minimax relative concession" holds that "in any co-operative
interaction, the rational joint strategy[-the strategy for all agents in
common-]is determined by a bargain among the co-operators in
which each advances his maximal claim and then offers a concession

9'See id.
92 See id.
93 Id. at 5.
94 GAUTHIER,

supra note 8, at 190. Gewirth points out that though realism about
the societal distribution of power is crucial, there is no reason for a rational master
to bargain with his slaves in the first place. Without entering into cooperative
behavior, Gauthier's masters need not accept the moral constraint of minimax
relative concession. GEWIRTH I, supra note 54, at 11-12, n.9.
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no greater in relative magnitude than the minimax concession."95
This means that bargaining proceeds with each party offering the
outcome that would give him the greatest utility and then conceding
to an outcome that deprives him of the least utility possible relative
to the interests of the remaining parties. This is Gauthier's supreme
moral principle by virtue of its impartiality; it avoids the placement
of the interests of one person in a higher relative position than those
of any other. 96 With this principle as a constraint on all human
97
-cooperation, people develop a "disposition to cooperate."
Consequently, constrained maximizers of utility will rationally make
deals with other constrained maximizers which they would not form
with persons not operating under the constraint of minimax relative
concession.9" In the latter case, constrained maximizers would be
hurt in bargains with non-constrained persons, and would choose no
bargain over a harmful one. 99 If one wants to enter a bargain, one
must develop the disposition to cooperate of the constrained
maximizer.' °
Unlike Rawls, Gauthier does not propose to determine rights
(or justice) as the outcome of an agreement among constrained
maximizers. Instead, "[r]ights provide the starting point for, and not
the outcome of, agreement."' 0' 1 For Gauthier, "[t]he moral claims that
each of us make on others, and that are expressed in our rights,
depend neither on our affections for each other, nor on our rational or
purposive capacities, as if these commanded inherent respect, but on
our actual or potential partnership in activities that bring mutual
benefit."' 10 2 Gewirthian generic rights were derived from our status
as prospective purposive agents, 0 3 while Gauthier maintains that we
are fundamentally prospective cooperators. Our rights come from the
9"GAUTHIER, supra note 8, at 145.
96 See id. at 125-6.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
'0oSee id.
'0'

Id. at 222.

102

Id.

103

See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
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so-called Lockean Proviso-a person has property in whatever she
uses her labor to remove from nature, "at least where there is enough
and as good left in common for others."' 1 4 In other words, the
proviso commands us not to take advantage of others and suggests
that there are rights to person--one owns oneself and, consequently
one's labor-and property justly acquired through the mixing of
one's labor with that property or its voluntary transfer by its just
owner. Only negative individual rights to security of person and
property need be guaranteed by the minimal state,'0 5 not the positive
rights to well-being embraced by Gewirth. Distributions of wellbeing are to be the subject of human cooperation.
The Gautherian libertarian would not disagree that there are
necessary'goods, nor, even, that such necessary goals include the
concepts of freedom and well-being identified by Gewirth. The
Gauterian libertarian, however, would quibble with the notion that a
showing of necessity is sufficient to justify the conversion of said
necessary goals into the subjects of claim-fights, thereby excluding
them from cooperative arrangements. Given Gautherian bargaining
over these necessary goods, "we need a demonstration that fights are
worth their price, that their costs to the rational individual are
outweighed by their benefits in the way of rights.' 0 6 This costbenefit analysis must be performed by everyone, in the libertarian
view, such that no one ends up worse off in any effort to improve the
lot of others. 0 7 In the language of economics, Gauthier's constrained
maximization ensures that all social bargains, including those over
the provision of necessary goods, are Pareto efficient.0" Once again,
the minimal state is not in the welfare business, but exists primarily

'04 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

17 (Thomas Peardon ed.,

Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
'os See supra note 78.
'06 Narveson, supra note 80, at 490.
107 See id.
0' See CHRISTOPHER PASS, BRYAN LOwES, LESLIE DAVIS, & SIDNEY KRONISH,

THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 385-87 (1991).
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to uphold cooperative agreements.

°9

Thus, in Narveson's words:

We will not, then, forsake violin lessons for our gifted
children in order to ... supply jobs to inner-city
residents. All those folks will just have to do the best
that they can, which is what negative rights leave
them free to do anyway. Such rights would also leave
any who may want to help them free to do that, too."0
Positive rights to well-being are required by Gewirth, lest prospective
purposive agents contradict themselves."' Narveson urges that
contradiction is not enforcement 12enough, but that cost-benefit
analysis and bargaining is required.'
In sum, the Rawlsian revolution in social contractarian
thought produced various responses from both advocates of positive
rights and libertarians. Having explained the social ethical
frameworks of Gewirth and Gauthier, I turn, in the following Part, to
an application of their principles to the case of workfare in New
York.
III. WORKFARE CONSIDERED

Beginning with the libertarian position, Gauthier and
Narveson would only require that individuals' security of person and
justly held property not be violated by the state through workfare.
Indeed, the state should not provide workfare as an attempt to
develop the productive agency of welfare dependents, as it is a
positive obligation. However, once the program begins, the state may

'09 The function of the state includes such things as police protection, because
bargaining over, say, goods cannot occur if those goods may be taken by a
nonparty to the bargain.
10 NARVESON, supra note 80, at 493.
11 The PGC is derived from a foundational truth which no individual can deny.
GEWIRTH II, supra note 54, at 135.
112

See NARVESON, supranote 80, at 492-93.
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not violate the liberties in the Lockean Proviso in its administration.
A morally unjustified program cannot provide the state an excuse to
deprive persons of fundamental liberty of person and property.
A serious question arises when one considers the bargaining
rights of welfare dependents to negotiate a job preparedness
program-the libertarian's "insurance"-- with employers. It is quite
simple for libertarians to argue against the creation of workfare
programs through the logic that "one who was contracting for general
social arrangements could not be understood to consent to
arrangements requiring us to pay costs for unnecessary benefits.""' 3
That argument suggests, first, that the parties most interested (welfare
dependents) in the subject of the compulsory program (work skills)
would contract for the private provision of insurance, a form of
contractual agreement, against deficient work skills according to the
principle of minimax relative concession. This insurance may take the
form of internship programs, skills workshops, and the like, provided
by employers in the private sector as well as the public sector, to the
extent that the latter relies on labor supply to fill its positions. The
incentive for employers to provide such insurance is entirely driven
by their demand for labor. Job types most needed by employers will
be over represented in training at any given time. This form of
insurance is the only possible solution consistent with contractarian
libertarianism.
Presumably, this insurance would provide for sufficient
training such that the covered welfare dependents could use
temporary assistance, i.e., TANF, to give themselves the ability to
end their dependent status. 14 However, Gewirth's criticism of
Gauthier sounds quite noticeable alarm: Why would employers enter
into an agreement with these poor employees at all? H 5 Welfare
dependents have been empirically demonstrated to be crushingly
supra note 56, at 247 (emphasis original).
that TANF is not consistent with the libertarian project, as it represents a
positive duty imposed on the state. I mention it here as a legal reality that any
insurance bargain in the contemporary American setting would be required to
acknowledge.
15 See GEWIRTH I, supranote 54.
113 NARVESON,
114 Note
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deficient in work skills, spatially mismatched from job locations,
etc." 6 Because of their unequal bargaining power, minimax relative
concession would force the welfare dependents to concede much
more than the employers, assuming that they surmount the gigantic
practical obstacle of organization to even advance their maximal
claim. 117 Second, as a practical alternative to such bargaining,
libertarianism would propose charity, as people are free to choose to
contribute to a program which prepares individuals for work. Given
that society is in substantial agreement about what is "for people's
good" (in this case, personal responsibility through unsubsidized
employment) charitable support of others is a nonenforceable moral
duty that we urge through "the duty to approve of those who do
contribute to the causes in question, even if one doesn't do so
oneself..' ". However, the temporary nature ofpublic assistance under
Welfare Reform mandates that dependent persons must prepare for
work in the near future. Charity, even with Narveson's weak
negative enforcement mechanism, is not correspondingly necessary
and consequently inadequate.
In sum, libertarians cannot argue for a palatable workfare
strategy after the program has been created. Since charity is
insufficient to restore persons to the position in which they might
bargain for insurance," 9 work opportunity, and so forth, the only
16

See supra text accompanying note 49.

The incentives on the part of employers would determine the result. For
example, in a tight labor market, employers might hire these workers at low wages
and make their operations more labor intensive because it is cost effective to do so.
Their only alternative would be to increase wages to attract those holding jobs
elsewhere. However, legal realities, such as the minimum wage, block this type of
bargain, and make the deal impossible. When the realities of the welfare state are
not assumed away, contractarian libertarianism and its deification of the private
bargain cannot provide useful solutions to the dilemmas of public assistance. See
supra note 114 for another example of the inadequacy of bargaining given the
constraints of the welfare state.
18 NARVESON, supra note 56, at 264.
119 Private expenditures are vital to the mixed (public and private) system of social
welfare in the U.S., but such efforts generally assist the working class and not the
poor. In 1977, for example, the federal government spent $52 billion on programs
for the poor while private philanthropy added only $3.7 billion. PATTERSON,
117
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tenable claim is against the de novo creation of the workfare program,
or any other social welfare program.120 The only argument concerns
the negotiation of a type of insurance, which forms the basis for
employment in the most demanded job classifications. However, the
likelihood of the bargain ever occurring is diminutive because of the
power imbalance between employers and the poor.
A recent line of thought known as postlibertarianism... is
directed toward the preoccupation of libertarian thought to justify
minimal government intrusion into capitalist markets:
Postlibertarianism means abandoning defenses of the
intrinsic justice of laissez-faire capitalism, the better
to investigate whether the systemic consequences of
interfering with capitalism are severe enough to
justify laissez-faire. Any sound case for laissez-faire
is likely to build on postlibertarian research, for the
conviction that laissez-faire is intrinsically just rests
upon unsound philosophical assumptions.' 22
In other words, postlibertarianism urges that the project shift from an
insistence that Lockean liberties be enforced by the minimal state to
an empirical analysis of the consequences of meddling with that
framework through the creation of the programs of the welfare state.

supra note 7, at 200.
120

It may be argued that a harsh workfare program, among other efforts, has the

effect of discouraging welfare application as part of a larger effort to dismantle the
welfare state. However, the very existence of the program, a positive measure of
state assistance, violates the principles of libertarianism and the minimal state. The
state is to stay out of the social welfare business. Social and economic support is
to be provided, if at all, through private agreements. See supra note 78.
121 This is a product of the later writings of Austrian economists;
see generally,
ISRAEL KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS

(1985) (particularly

the essay entitled "The Perils of Regulation: A Market-Process Approach");
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM

(1988).

Jeffrey Friedman, After Libertarianism:Rejoinder to Narveson, McCloskey,
Flew, and Machan, 6 CRITICAL REV. 113, 113 (1992) (emphasis in original).
122
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The assertion is that it is now time to test libertarianism against real
data.
Postlibertarianism cannot solve the problem addressed in this
article. Even in the event that postlibertarian empirical research were
to demonstrate that interference in the labor market through programs
such as workfare is unwise, libertarians would be in no better position
to assess the state of an existing workfare program than without that
evidence. One such empirical conclusion might be that insurancebased workfare fills labor demand as previously noted. First, such a
conclusion would have to assume that bargaining is possible. To
require employers to bargain would be an interference with their
liberty which cannot be tolerated in the libertarian synthesis. Second,
internal critiques of any extant employment programs could only take
the form of an insistence that the government get out of the business
of employment assistance as soon as possible to make room for
private bargains, which is no improvement over theoretical assertions
unless the tenet of unforced bargaining is dispelled. A naYve version
of this consequentialist approach is employed by Narveson in his
suggestion that Gewirth's programs could not endure a cost-benefit
analysis.1 3 If a program fails the cost-benefit analysis, libertarianism
only allows for its destruction. Empirical proof or not, there can be
no adjustment, only abandonment, because no private bargain would
be reached for any positive assistance package between that
characterizing the program being assessed and no program at all.' 24
There is no incentive for individuals to enter an agreement that harms
them; given a set of programs that fail a cost-benefit analysis or no
program, the only Pareto-optimal outcome is to choose no program.
Once the program is eradicated, libertarianism would not allow for
the creation of another government program to take its place. At its
essence, the problem is simply that the existence of the welfare state
is anathema to libertarian philosophy, and as such, cannot be
comprehended in terms of its principles.
'2 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
124 This is not to say that no social welfare program

would pass the cost-benefit
analysis. The purpose of postlibertarianism is to objectively do the analysis and
urge that those programs which fail be terminated.
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Gewirth, in contrast, has briefly spoken directly to the
problems of workfare in relation to his moral philosophy. First, the
policy rationale for WEP12 5 is similar to his assertion that although
"[tihe principle of human rights requires that welfare dependents be
supported, . . . it requires also that strenuous efforts be made to
remove the morally unjustified conditions that generate the need for
[welfare] dependence."' 126 Workfare moves toward this goal by
satisfying:
(1) the mutuality requirement of human rights-recipients
contribute to society through their work or develop the skills in job
training to so contribute-and
(2) by making welfare recipients autonomous. 127 However,
Gewirth notes that many welfare recipients have lived their lives in
debilitating poverty, and likely do not "have the emotional and
intellectual abilities.., needed to take advantage of the opportunities
they may be offered."'2 8 Thus, the equality condition is not met.
Second, the prohibitive cost of child care may make workfare unduly
burdensome for welfare mothers. 129 Third, "[w]hatever be the
handicaps with which they enter the work situation, workfare to be
justified requires, on the part of those who offer and control it, an
attitude of support, cooperation, and respect, such as is required by
the positive human rights in general.' 30 Finally, the nature of the
mandated work must not be mere toil.' 3 ' Gewirth's "principle of
human rights [the PGC] requires that welfare recipients.., be given
realistic hope that they can develop their abilities of productive
agency so that they are not forced to work at the lowest levels of their
competence, but instead are enabled to come as close as their latent
125 N.Y.
126

Soc. Serv. Law § 331 (McKinney 1998).

GEWIRTH I, supra note 54, at 127.

127See id.
121 Id. at 128-29.
129 See id. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Nancy Wright, Welfare
Reform Under the PersonalResponsibilityAct: Ending Welfare as We Know It or
Governmental ChildAbuse?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (1998). See also infra
text accompanying notes 136-137.
130GEWIRTH I, supra note 54, at 130.
131 See id.
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abilities permit to the creative mode of work.,
of work generally places emphasis on:

13 2

203

The creative mode

[I]ts valuable product, as in "work of art" or "master
work," rather than on the arduous process. But the
process of work itself is also very different from the
depressive mode [i.e., toil, drudgery, stressful, and
deadening. Its process] is not only instrumental to the
fulfillment of needs but is itself a need, for in its
overcoming of obstacles it is "a liberating activity,"
a "positive, creative activity," so that it is intrinsically
satisfying to the worker. Such work makes use of
persons' higher mental faculties; it is taken on freely
and gladly and the worker has a justified sense of
achievement, for it is a
personal responsibility and
133
form of "self-realization.'
Placement of individuals in the PACT program exemplifies
the problem of inattention to the creative mode of work, and the
Gewirthian ethic in general. In analyzing the program, Gewirth
might begin by noting that it fulfills the requirement of mutuality in
132Id. at

131. This position is to be distinguished from the psychological literature
on the effects of unemployment. For example, one study found that in general, the
unemployed and those individuals dissatisfied with their employment displayed
poorer psychological well-being than those satisfied with their jobs and students
on a range of measures. Anthony Winefield et al., The PsychologicalImpact Of
Unemployment And Unsatisfactory Employment In Young Men And Women:
Longitudinal And Cross-SectionalData, 82 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 473 (1991). The
determination of the work as 'mere toil' is one to be made by all individuals in
society, consistent with the Principle of Generic Consistency, not merely the
individual doing the work. One may be more satisfied with drudgery than the
absence of work, but the rest of society morally owes the promise of more fulfilling
employment to that individual. Consequently, a social program such as WEP must
avoid tasks that do not comport with an individual's capacity for creative work.
This must be decided ad hoc. For these reasons, the psychological literature in this
area is not germane to the principal analysis.
133Id. (quoting Karl Marx, Economic and PhilosophicManuscripts of 1944, in
THE MARX-ENGELS READER 74 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978)).
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that these services do provide a benefit to society in the form of
cleaner parks. Nonetheless, the work provided by PACT is "mere
toil," and cannot be seen as the acquisition of a skill, or any other
means of preparing PACT participants for productive agency. The
narratives Capersv. Guiliani demonstrate that PACT participants are
not treated with the respect that Gewirth mandates. 3 4 Instead, they
work in unnecessarily squalid conditions, under supervision imbued
with an air of punishment that contradicts the rehabilitative purpose
underlying workfare.'35
To the extent that these conditions place persons in danger of
physical harm, even libertarians must balk, for the security of person
that must be provided as one of the negative liberties is being violated
by the state. While Gewirth notes a violation of a right derived from
well-being, this argument asserts that the Lockean liberty of personal
security is abridged. Consequently, the libertarian remedy need not
require the state to make positive safety improvements to workfare
jobs. Eliminating the entire workfare program would be preferred to
costly measures toward the improvement of safety because the latter
remedy is a positive step. The safety problem, then, provides more
force to propel the libertarian polemic against the positive welfare
state.
The low wages paid in conjunction with WEP place
constraints on participants that should not exist when, as Gewirth
requires, the state cooperates with these persons. In the case of
mothers who must work, workfare devalues the contribution that they
make in terms of household production, e.g., child rearing,
housekeeping, by insisting that the only compensable work is
performed in the labor market. Low wages make it virtually
impossible to hire child care services that provide for adequate child

See supra text accompanying note 130. For purposes of this philosophical
discussion, the evidentiary value of these statements is irrelevant. Because of the
subjective elements of Gewirth's synthesis mentioned above, it matters only that
this is how WEP is perceived by its participants and that society owes them better
conditions. See also supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
135 See GEWIRTH I, supra note 54,
at 130.
134
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care while mothers are at their workfare assignments.'36 Even
assuming that WEP prepares these mothers for unsubsidized
employment, and further, that such employment will provide
sufficient financial resources for the procurement of child care, these
mothers, at the present moment, are placed in an untenable position.
The difficulty of the above assumptions makes the situation all the
more precarious. WEP does not cooperate with or support these
mothers in their quest for productive agency. It treats them with a
lack of dignity 3 7 in that it does not value their household production.
For Gewirth, it is a clear violation of human rights.
The wage structure of WEP also creates inequities for those
who have temporarily fallen upon hard times and must depend upon
public benefits. In Enzian v. Wing,138 the petitioner's workfare
assignment was that of a "clerical aide entitled only to minimum
wage" in which he was to perform data entry for the local court
clerk's office. 139 However, his employer "discovered that he had
knowledge of software and programming and directed him to design
database systems and other software tools" while earning only
minimum wage.'40 Though the court ruled that the petitioner be paid
a wage comparable to those employees who do such computer
programming, as noted in Part I, this decision was mooted when the
4
legislature established the minimum wage as the workfare wage.1 1
Clearly, the state ran roughshod over the petitioner's dignity and
behaved opportunistically, violating equality and mutuality, when
presented with one who could do sophisticated work at a fraction of
the cost. Gewirth's insistence upon support and cooperation require
that the state use the petitioner's skills to prepare him for a job that
approaches the creative mode of work. For the petitioner, a

136

Some jurisdictions, i.e., Wisconsin, have taken the child care issue into

consideration when drafting their welfare reform measures. New York has not.
PATTERSON, supranote 7, at 221-23.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 80
- 89.
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See Enzian v. Wing, 248 App. Div. 965.

3 See id. at 284.
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reasonable ultimate placement would be an advanced position in the
computer field. The Enzian Trial Court upheld Gewirthian dignity,
while the Legislature stripped it away once again. Given the
legislative edict, the Supreme Court Appellate Division in Brukhman
v. Guilianifound itself without the power to make a moral choice.
Similar concerns are raised by the WEP assignments that
made it effectively impossible for students receiving public assistance
to procure a college education. 42 As an initial matter, Gewirth's
framework allows any purpose that is perceived by an agent as good
to be the basis for purposiveness. Therefore, workfare must not
channel persons into jobs that currently have high employment rates
without inquiring into the desire and ability of program participants
43
to do such work in popular quick attachment to work initiatives.
Recall that this is precisely what the libertarian insurance scheme
would do. The implication is that if a higher education is appropriate
for the individual, e.g., she has the mental and emotional capability
to complete the program, and she desires that training over other job
options, then she should be allowed to give that education her best
effort, unencumbered by weighty workfare hours requirements. The
New York courts have responded to this concern, enjoining welfare
officials to make such individual evaluations when determining WEP
placements.' 44 Mayor Guiliani's comments, noted in Part I, regarding
the restoration of dignity through work, fail to capture the
individualistic character of human dignity. At least for the present,
the courts have defined dignity in a manner closer to that envisioned
by Gewirth.
IV. CONCLUSION

This article has discussed two themes with regard to social
thought. First, libertarianism, even in the contractarian version
142 See supra notes 36-40.
143 One such job is the certified

nurse assistant. See Frances Riemer, Quick

attachments to the workforce: An ethnographic analysis of a transitionfrom
welfare to low-wagejobs, 21 Soc. WORKRES. 225 (1997).
" Davila v. Hanimons, Index No. 407163/96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 1998).
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propounded by Gauthier and Narveson, is a theoretical framework for
a highly idealized world. It can propose alternatives to the welfare
state, but offers precious little guidance with regard to the moral
optimization of programs which have been established. It can blame
the creators of such programs for imposing positive duties upon the
state, though it cannot, without contradicting its tenets, offer any
suggestions to present welfare administrators for aligning their
functions with the principles of libertarianism except that all social
welfare programs be eradicated. This is not the fault of libertarians,
but of their theory. Consequently, pure libertarianism is only
applicable to those individuals who have lived in a free market
society since the beginning oftime, quite probably a nullity in present
society. Contractarianism allows Gauthier and Narveson the
opportunity to insist that persons can bargain their way out of unjust
situations, but cannot bring them to terms with the severe bargaining
inequity that history has engendered among the various groups in
society. Given that, it is not my position to assail Gauthier's
philosophical project, for it indeed adds to the void left by the
insufficiency of the Rawlsian veil in its attempt to infuse
contractarian bargaining with rational actors. I am essentially critical
of Narveson's policy implications which I find entirely ineffective,
and even preposterous, given the reality of the welfare state in which
the people of the United States live.145
Second, I have provided evidence that Gewirth's synthesis
does embrace the reality of the welfare state. Though all programs
that he would justify would certainly be costly, and would
undoubtedly face criticism in the contemporary American political
landscape far overshadowing that of Narveson, 146 the critical point is
that Gewirth can make observations that assist welfare administrators
and lawmakers in improving the moral quality of social programs.
Furthermore, Gewirth is keenly aware of the Kantian notion that
'ought implies can.' His social ethic may be politically infeasible in
the current political climate, but it establishes a long-run aspirational
Narveson is Canadian, and I would maintain that his society embodies even
more characteristics of the positive welfare state that my own.
146 See generally NARvESON, supra note 80.
145
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framework for social welfare policy. Narveson's cost-benefit critique
entirely misconstrues this fundamental idea of social ethics. More
fundamentally, it is not Narveson's misconstruction that is the only
problem, but rather the urging of libertarianism to eradicate the
welfare state that provides a irreconcilable social ethic.
It is important to recognize that Gewirth agrees with the
purpose of workfare, though with little of its practice in New York.
That workfare may ideally reduce welfare dependency and the size of
the social safety net over time by attending to the dignity of
individual recipients stands in striking contrast to the libertarian
implication that welfare programs violate taxpayers' rights to
property and should be terminated immediately. In the United States,
and the majority of Western societies, the latter statement borders on
147
absurdity.
Workfare in New York, as has been shown, is an importunate
issue that is far from moral soundness. Gewirth's framework
uncovers numerous human rights violations. Even libertarians would
sound alarm over the treatment of some participants in their work
assignments. This analysis, I believe, identifies some clear directions
in which workfare reform might proceed for the betterment of all
involved. First, steps should be taken to eliminate the drudgery in
and increase the safety of workfare assignments. The courts have a
chance to make such a moral decision in Capers v. Guiliani,which
is currently on appeal. Second, caseworkers must conduct individual
assessments into the abilities and employment inclinations of
workfare participants. In Matthews v. Barrios-Paoli,the court
directed that "employability plans" for participants of ages eighteen
and nineteen be conducted in a way that moves closer to this goal. In
the court's words:
Instead of making use of this statutory mandate [that
employability plans be created] in a way that will
teach, mentor and assist these young people-a

147

Of course, libertarians would argue that my statement identifies a fundamental

problem of these societies.

1999

WORKFARE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

209

statutory mandate that includes requiring their
participation in the development of an employment
plan, requires the use of support services assistance
with educational scholarships and loans-the
defendants [DSS] failed to create any plan and claim
the right not to develop a plan for a year by which
time it might be moot, but has more to do with
emptying trash cans than furthering the learning
experience. This might be an apt use of the current
technological expression 'garbage in, garbage out., 148
Third, proper payment for work completed must be established, by
means of the Constitutional requirement of prevailing wage payment,
to comport with human dignity and mutuality. The legislature
mandated minimum wage payment after the Enzian court made the
correct moral determination. Minimum wage for all workfare
participants intrudes upon dignitary rights. Fourth, mothers
participating in workfare must be availed of free or affordable child
care. This is not presently an issue before the New York courts or
legislature.
Given the evidence presented here, the human rights record of
the New York courts is quite good, while the legislature has
performed inadequately. The constitutional framework of separation
of powers precludes the courts from resolving all of the current
human rights abrogations in the New York workfare program. The
onus is on the legislature to take the appropriate measures. This is its
moral imperative.

14'

676 N.Y.S.2d at 764.

